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Abstract
The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, there is an attempt to provide a detailed description of the political 
manifestos of the new parties, which have emerged in Tunisia since the breakdown of the authoritarian re-
gime and the establishment of democracy. The array of policies dealt with by the party manifestos is surpris-
ingly wide and the secular-confessional dimension is present together with others. Secondly, the structuring 
of the party cleavages is addressed. It is argued that it could be hardly reduced to the classic cleavage theory 
formulated by Lipset and Rokkan. The re-alignment of the Tunisian party system has taken the form of two 
opposing coalitions although deep regional and socio-economic cleavages have not helped political integra-
tion. Three regions are identified in terms of political continuity and socio-economic development, Sahel and 
Tunis, the South (Sfax and Kairouan), finally the Western underdeveloped areas at the border with Algeria. 
The current development of the Tunisian party system is described, referring to its dynamics and the general 
perspective of the democratization process.
Lo scopo di questo articolo è duplice. In primo luogo, è avanzato un tentativo di fornire una descrizione 
dettagliata dei manifesti politici dei nuovi partiti emersi in Tunisia dopo la rottura del regime au-
toritario e l’instaurazione della democrazia. L’insieme delle politiche trattate dai manifesti partitici è 
sorprendentemente ampio e la dimensione secolare-confessionale è sì presente ma insieme ad altre. 
In secondo luogo, viene affrontata la strutturazione delle fratture partitiche e viene evidenziato come 
questa possa difficilmente essere ridotta entro i termini della teoria classica della formulata da Lipset 
e Rokkan. Il riallineamento del sistema partitico tunisino ha preso la forma di due coalizioni contrap-
poste, sebbene l’integrazione politica non sia stata facilitata dalle divisioni regionali e socio-economi-
che profonde. Tre regioni sono identificate in termini di continuità politica e sviluppo socio-econom-
ico, Sahel e Tunisi, il Sud (Sfax e Kairouan), infine le aree sottosviluppate occidentali al confine con 
l’Algeria. Viene descritto lo sviluppo attuale del sistema partitico tunisino, facendo riferimento alle sue 
dinamiche e alla prospettiva generale del processo di democratizzazione.
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Introduction
After the fall of authoritarian regime in 2011, Tunisia started a transition to democracy 
which has been largely deemed as successful. Three subsequent elections have been 
held at the national level so far, namely the elections to the Constituent Assembly 
(Assemblée Nationale Constituante, ANC) in October 2011, and the Parliamentary and 
Presidential elections in 2014.1 At the 2011 elections to the Constituent Assembly the 
center-right and Islamist Ennahdha (EN, Renaissance) gained 37% of the vote and a rel-
ative majority in the Assembly, while most of the remaining seats were divided among 
a variety of secular, mostly center-left parties, and some personal parties characterized 
by charismatic leadership and\or led by businessmen. The 2014 Parliamentary showed 
a different picture, since the new secular party Nidaa Tounes (NT, Tunisia Call) result-
ed as the winner and conquered also the Presidency in the same year. The Tunisian 
party system seemed to align around two major poles, orbiting around NT on the cen-
tre-left and EN on the centre-right. Nonetheless, there could not be said to be the 
establishment of a true bi-polar or two-party system working according to the Western 
Government-Opposition pattern. NT and EN have been the two major parties in the 
country during 2011-14, but at the moment EN is more likely to establish itself as a 
major player on the Tunisian political scene. Notwithstanding the fact that these two 
main parties dominate respectively the secular and the Islamist camp, the Tunisian 
party system persists in its high levels of fragmentation and polarization, both re-
vealed by the profound ideological differences between the two parties and also by 
their regional rooting. If the secular-confessional cleavage shapes the Tunisian polit-
ical party system, other social and political cleavages enter into the picture and affect 
the alignment of the parties on the political space. 
After a brief examination of the context which led to the breakdown of the author-
itarian regime in 2011 and the subsequent democratization phase, we focus on the 
elections to the ANC and the subsequent political elections in 2014. We aim at pro-
viding an insight over the Tunisian secular-confessional cleavage through a content 
analysis of the manifestos of the three major parties which entered the 2011 elections, 
namely EN, the Congrès pour la République(CPR) and Ettakatol (FDTL), and of NT which 
eventually established itself as a pivotal actor and replaced FDTL as a reference point 
for the progressive electorate in the aftermath of the transition to democracy. FDTL 
represented initially the ideological field of the secular forces in Tunisia, which was 
subsequently occupied in 2014 by NT. We therefore use the content analysis on the 
1 Local elections were held in May 2018 that are not included in the present analysis although 
considered in the conclusive chapter to interpret the general trend of the Tunisian party system.
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parties’ programmes as proxy of the secular-ideological political spectrum in Tunisia. 
In this way, we are able to have a relatively homogeneous picture referring to the ini-
tial phase of the Tunisian democratization, which culminates with the elections of the 
ANC and the 2014 elections.
From a theoretical point of view, it is argued that the classic Rokkan approach to 
the analysis of the spatial party alignment suffers because of its eurocentricity. The 
manifestos show indeed a much more complex matrix of themes, that cannot easily 
be reduced to the functional and territorial axis which have shaped the European po-
litical landscape according to Rokkan (1967). The compromise reached by EN with a 
wide spectrum of secular parties between 2011 and 2014 favoured the adoption of the 
new democratic constitution and hastened the reorganization of the secular camp an-
ticipating the 2014 electoral outcome. The re-alignment of the party system took the 
form of two opposing coalitions although deep regional and socio-economic cleavages 
have not helped political integration. Three areas are identified in terms of political 
continuity and socio-economic development, Sahel and Tunis, the South, Sfax and 
Kairouan, and finally the Western underdeveloped areas at the border with Algeria. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the parties in the secular camp changed labelling over 
time, their appeal in these three areas did not decline in 2011-2014. As has been point-
ed out (Van Hamme, Gana and Ben Rebbah 2014), the North-South cleavage emerged 
during the state-building process in the post-colonial phase and it is connected to the 
different socio-economic levels of development. 
The Breakdown of the Authoritarian Regime in 2011 and the Elections 
to the Constituent Assembly
As has already been pointed out (Battera 2012, Ieraci 2013a, Ieraci 2013b), the polit-
ical stability of Tunisia after the declaration of independence in 1956 was very much 
guaranteed by the ability of the regime to channel a relatively low level of mobili-
zation through a party organization (the Rassemblement constitutionnel démocratique, 
RCD).2 The party became an instrument of state control and managed various aspects 
of society, from access to the state bureaucracy via patronage to the control of market 
sectors and of the national economic system. Tunisia held political elections but they 
were not free and fair, because the oppositions were excluded, while the Parliament 
played a symbolic function of ratification of the decision of the autocrat. This func-
2 RCD was constituted in 1988 by cadres of the former bourguibist Parti Socialiste destourien (PSD) in 
support of president Ben Ali.
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tion was symbolic because of the position of the Parliaments and their irrelevance in 
decision-making, and because of the presence of a dominant party. In Tunisia, 20% of 
the seats were formally reserved for the opposition, but the RCD of President Ben Ali 
assured more than 80%, thanks to an electoral system which attributed to the majority 
party in each constituency all the available seats (Ieraci 2013b: 19). 
When Ben Ali fled and a new government was announced on January 17th, 2011 
this government included twelve members of the ruling RCD. Mass protests continued 
leading to a reshuffle of the government and the dismissal of all the RCD members 
with the exclusion of the Prime minister. In April 2011 an electoral commission was 
instituted to design a new electoral system, which turned out to be a PR with party 
lists and individual seats distributed between lists in constituencies using the largest 
remainder method. According to this method, the lists are closed, a voter can only 
choose between lists, and not individual candidates, and is required to alternate be-
tween men and women. The 2011 reform is of crucial relevance, in that it established 
the electoral system to be used in Tunisia ever since.
Elections for the ANC were held on the following October 23rd, 2011. The primary 
issue of controversy during the campaign opposed the role of secularism and Islam 
in public life and their place in the Constitution. While EN tried to spread the im-
age of a party which was marked by pluralistic principles such as civil freedoms and 
equality, most of the secular elite worried about the likelihood that once in power the 
party would endanger achieved civil rights, and in particular women rights. The public 
was indeed well conscious that it would be summoned to vote not only for the ANC 
but, more important, also for a new government. From the results (see Tab. 1), two 
main political tendencies emerged. The confessional and pro-Islam side of the politi-
cal spectrum was coherent and dominated by EN. On the opposite side, the secularist 
‘lib-lab’ camp was divided by different conceptions of the economy, ranging from the 
liberal (Afek Tounes) to ‘labour’ approach (Parti démocrate progressiste, PDP; Ettakatol, 
FDTL; Pôle démocratique moderniste, PDM), and by different degrees of commitment 
with the former regime. A third party, the CPR (Congrès pour la République), emerged 
as standing between the two recalled confessional-secular tendencies. There was the 
communist PCOT (Parti communiste des ouvriers de Tunisie), which refused to join the 
secular ‘lib-lab’ camp, and finally the partisans of the former regime were allowed to 
run for elections and they gathered around al-Moubadara (‘The Initiative’).
In total, 4,308,888 Tunisians turned out (52%), and about 4 million of votes were 
declared valid. Ennahdha obtained 37.0% of the votes and was able to gain 89 seats 
out of the 217 of the ANC (see Tab. 1). It is noteworthy that the third most voted 
party there was the PP (Pétition populaire), a personalist and populist party founded 
by a businessman (Hechmi Hamdi). About 20% of the electorate voted for the sec-
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Tab. 1 – 2011 Constituent Assembly Election (Turn out 52.0%)
PARTY SEATS VOTES %
EN 89 1,502,000 37.0
CPR 29 354 ,000 8.7
PÉTITION POPULAIRE 26 274,000 6.7
FDTL (ETTAKATOL) 20 285,000 7.0
PDP 16 160,000 3.9
AL-MOUBADARA 5 130,000 3.2
PDM 5 113,000 2.8
AFEK TOUNES 4 77,000 1.9
PdT 3 64,000 1.6
Others 20 1,095,000 27.2
Total Valid 217 4,054,000 100.0
[Source: ISIE 2011]
Tab. 2 – Distribution of the Vote for EN in the Constituencies of Three Areas in the 2011 Political 
Elections
Sahel and Tunis % South, Sfax and Kairouan % West %
TUNIS 1 46.3 KAIROUAN 43.0 BEJA 31.1
TUNIS 2 30.3 SFAX 1 44.1 JENDOUBA 28.0
ARIANA 36.1 SFAX 2 37.8 LE KEF 26.7
BEN AROUS 42.3 GABES 53.0 SILIANA 28.5
LA MANOUBA 40.7 MÉDENINE 47.7 KASSERINE 31.8
BIZERTE 41.0 TOZEUR 43.1 SIDI BOU ZID 15.6
NABEUL 1 31.3 KEBILI 40.5 GAFSA 40.4
NABEUL 2 29.6 TATAOUINE 59.4
ZAGHOUAN 34.6
SOUSSE 35.8
MONASTIR 32.5
MAHDIA 31.1
[Source: ISIE 2011]
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ular parties (al-Moubadara and the communists included). About 9% of votes went 
to CPR and the rest were dispersed among other 17 parties for a total of 27.2% of the 
votes. These other minor parties were all characterized by weak ideological profiles 
and personalism.
As above recalled, if the Tunisian socio-economic and demographic develop-
ment in the post-colonial phase is taken into account, three areas could be identified 
(Sahel and Tunis, the South, and the West). Tab. 2 reports the electoral results of 
EN in the constituencies of the three areas, as a proxy of the confessional vote. EN 
performed at its best in the southern electoral constituencies, particularly Gabes, 
Médenine and Tataouine, while its lower scores were recorded in three western elec-
toral constituencies, and particularly in Sidi Bou Zid. It should be considered that 
the revolt against the regime spread from the western districts of Sidi Bou Zid, Le 
Kef and Jendouba, characterized by economic underdevelopment in comparison with 
the coastal north.
Unable to form a government alone, EN started talks with the other parties in search 
for a coalition arrangement and an agreement on the distribution of the political offic-
es. The CPR, having no prejudices against EN, was prompt to join the coalition govern-
ment. Ettakatol followed, although this move generated much disappointment among 
its cadres and electors. By the end of October Hamadi Jbeli (Ennahdha) was elected 
Prime minister. A month later Mustapha Ben Jaafar, leader of Ettakatol, was elected as 
President of the ANC, and on the 12th December Moncef Marzouki was elected by the 
ANC as President of the Republic with 75% of votes. The outcome of the Tunisian elec-
tions to the ANC had an immediate worldwide impact and it was positively welcomed 
by comments and analysis. Some factors, such as the degree of urbanization, the estab-
lishment of large cross-class coalition, and the absence of communal cleavages, were 
considered conducive for democratic transition in the Tunisian case (Brumberg 2013; 
Hinnebush 2015). 
Political Struggle and party competition in the Early Democratization 
Phase. Party Manifestos and the 2011 Elections
Our aim is to identify the main party cleavages that have occurred in Tunisia after 
the collapse of authoritarianism. Despite some inter-party conflicts (Yardimci-Geyikçi 
and Tür 2018), the Tunisian transition still stands out as a case of success among the 
countries of the Arab spring. We can assume as in the classic interpretation of Lipset 
and Rokkan that a political party is at the same time an agent of conflict and an in-
strument of integration. The parties integrate the components of a society because 
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“they have served as essential agencies of mobilization” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 4). 
But at the same time, the parties “help to crystallize and make explicit the conflict-
ing interests” Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 5). This dual function of the parties is always 
evident in politics and becomes even more crucial in the phases of democratic tran-
sition, when the problem of reconciliation and the organization of the first open and 
competitive elections arises. The general assumption of Lipset and Rokkan is that “the 
crucial cleavages and their political expressions can be ordered within […] a territorial 
dimension of the national cleavage structure and […] a functional dimension” (Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967: 10). This scheme is general enough to be conveniently adapted to 
various contexts. Moreover, it seems to grasp with considerable appropriateness the 
main causes of party conflict within a state. In fact, the territorial dimension refers to 
the possibility that reactions of peripheral regions, linguistic minorities, and culturally 
threatened population to the pressures of the central elites emerge in the formation 
of the state, or following a regime transition and the attempt of new elites to seize the 
power. The functional dimension, for its part, is useful to identify “the typical conflict 
over short-term or long-term allocations of resources, products, and benefits in the 
economy” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 10). An explicit “territorial question” is not pres-
ent in the post-authoritarian phase of Tunisia, which as a post-independence state has 
not suffered from conflicts with linguistic and territorial minorities. However, the so-
cio-political development of Tunisia cannot be defined as balanced, because the areas 
of the Mediterranean coast enjoy a higher level of wealth and economic progress than 
those of the south and west of the country.
The functional dimension and the territorial dimension are therefore connected 
in the Tunisian case and it is for this reason that the Lipset-Rokkan scheme can be 
fruitful. Nonetheless, the “critical junctures” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 47) that im-
pacted on the functional and territorial-cultural axes and generated the center-pe-
riphery, church-state, land-industry and owner-worker fractures are specific to Europe 
and have no equivalent in the short history of post-colonial Tunisia. We must therefore 
see how in the Tunisian case contingent cleavages have emerged on the functional 
and territorial axes. To do this, two research strategies could be followed. One would 
imply the systematic study of territorial, cultural and class heterogeneities. It would be 
a question of applying an extensive research strategy to the Tunisian case, analogous 
for example to that applied by Bartolini (2000) to the study of the mobilization of the 
European left between 1860 and 1980. However, this perspective goes beyond the lim-
its of this research, which mainly aims to assess the reactions of the new party system 
following the democratic transition. Therefore, we needed to adopt a less ambitious 
research strategy, but which would promise to lead more directly to the answers of 
some basic questions. What are the main parties that appeared on the Tunisian polit-
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ical scene after the transition? How did they fit into the political space? What are the 
main dividing lines in this space?
For this second research strategy, the solution consisted in searching for a proxy 
variable of the parties’ positions on the «space of competition» which is conceived as 
party-defined space (Budge and Farlie 1977). The Manifesto Research Group (Budge 
2001) offered an insight, that suggested submitting the party manifestos to a content 
analysis in order to detect the positioning of the parties on the “left-to-right” political 
continuum. In a first stage, the researcher is supposed to identify and classify ex-ante 
the political issues according to their “leftist” or “rightist” features. Subsequently, a 
content analysis on some text is run, through which: “The percentages of sentences 
coded into each category constitute the data used in further statistical analysis, such 
as the Left-Right scales […] these identified certain categories as belonging theoreti-
cally to the right (‘free enterprise’, for example) and certain to the left (such as ‘eco-
nomic planning’)” (Budge 2001: 78).
With respect to this solution, we have adopted some variants. The first and most im-
portant one was the renunciation of defining ex-ante left and right. Not only do these 
categories apply with difficulty to non-European countries, they also limit the analysis 
of the competition space in a one-dimensional sense. Although ‘left’ and ‘right’ may 
have universal character (for example, left may be associated with ‘eager for equality’, 
whilst right may be associated with ‘preservation of traditions’), their contents are 
necessarily historically (during which time?) and spatially (in which context or even 
country?) determined, something which makes cross-time and cross-national compar-
ison rather unreliable. There is the risk not to measure ‘objective’ party positions but 
rather ‘subjective’ (the researcher’s) reactions to certain stimuli. Secondly, the cleav-
ages that emerge along the two assumed territorial-cultural and functional dimen-
sions are contingent, that is, they result from the political manifestos of the parties as 
direct and spontaneous manifestations of the positions. 
As we have said (see Tab. 1), the 2011 elections for the ANC signaled three main 
parties of the post-authoritarian phase, namely EN (Ennahdha), the Congrès pour la 
République (CPR) and Ettakatol (FDTL). Our analysis was conducted on the manifestos 
of these three parties, and on the manifesto of Nidaa Tounes (NT) which was founded in 
2012 and soon became a point of reference of the moderate and progressive camp. EN 
and FDTL are particularly significant, because they constitute the reference points of 
the political debate along the confessional (EN) and secular (FDTL) axis. Furthermore, 
FDTL can rightly be considered the precursor of NT, which became a pivotal party after 
its success in the 2014 general elections. FDTL stand at the origin of the networks of 
the secularists and the old regime forces, which eventually led to the foundation of 
NT (Boubekeur 2016). The case of CPR can be considered intermediate with respect to 
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these two. In fact, CPR stems from the historical opposition to Ben Ali’s regime and 
combines references to the values  of Western democracy and to the Tunisian identity. 
In its founding declaration (which dates 2001), CPR declared as its goal to establish 
for the first time in Tunisia a republican regime, guaranteeing freedom of speech, of 
organization and expression as well as the holding of free and fair elections. CPR also 
calls for the enactment of a new constitution establishing a strict separation of powers, 
the respect for human rights and gender equality. In addition, CPR calls for a “renego-
tiation” of Tunisian commitments to the European Union and support the right to the 
self-determination of peoples, particularly in support of the Palestinian cause. 
The methodology here employed aims at a content analysis of the official political 
programs of the three parties, that is of their “political manifestos”. The frequencies 
of the themes or issues presented in these programs have been recorded, but care 
has been taken to distinguish between “axial symbols” and “connected symbols”. The 
axial symbols are those that appear in each sentence of the program as the subject or 
the main object of the sentence itself. The connected symbols are those subordinate 
to the axial symbols. For example, in the hypothetical phrase “The Tunisian iden-
tity must be the reference point for the development of the political community”, 
“Tunisian identity” will be registered as an axial symbol and “development of the 
Tunisian community” as a symbol connected to it. In general, the syntactic structure 
of these programs is elementary (subject, verb, predicate) and although there may 
be differences in the connection between verbs and predicates, or even if the same 
subject can be connected to the object or objects with multiple predicates, these 
differences have not been recorded. Indeed, our aim is not a linguistic analysis, but 
a substantial one. When an axial symbol is linked to several connected symbols, we 
have counted the frequencies by associating them with the axial symbol, as shown in 
the tables in the Appendix.
We can briefly characterize the four parties (see the tables in the Appendix). EN 
presents itself as a traditionalist party linked to the affirmation of Muslim identity. 
“Arab identity” is the most frequent axial symbol. “Tunisian society” is another im-
portant axial symbol, but it is often connected to a symbol such as “Arab-Muslim iden-
tity” and also “independent from the state”. “Youth” and “Women” are important axial 
symbols, but often connected to symbols that recall a traditionalist vision, such as 
“family”, “freedom against clothing style” (which emphasizes freedom from western 
styles), “mother (breastfeeding)” and “as rural economic worker “. In the program of 
EN we also find constant references to “Development” (axial symbol), which is fre-
quently connected to “local, regional, balanced”, “agricultural”, “Tunisian production”. 
Finally, there is no procedural conception of democracy and the axial symbol “People” 
is frequently connected to that of “sovereignty (of the people)”. Ultimately, EN could 
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be seen as a traditionalist party, with a local and regional vision of economic develop-
ment and ultimately linked to a populist conception of democracy.
In the case of FDTL we find a more secular view of politics and also a more mod-
ern conception of social and political development. “State” is the most common axial 
symbol. Other axial symbols make it clear that FDTL adheres to a procedural and 
rational-legal vision of politics, for example “Constitution”, “Parliament”, “Rights”, 
“Judiciary and justice”, “Administration”. All these axial symbols are actually ab-
sent in the EN program. Economic development is conceived in capitalist terms, as 
shown by the frequency of the axial symbol “Investments” and its connection to 
“Infrastructure”, “Bank orientation to investment”, “Private investment”, “Business 
culture” and the like. FDTL also places great emphasis on “Training and education”. 
We find among the axial symbols references to the territorial dimension but a “stat-
ist” perspective is privileged. “Regional and municipal administrative structures” 
is an axial symbol associated with “Autonomy”, “Decentralization”, “Support for 
regions and municipalities”. The very conception of “Administration” (axial sym-
bol) is modern, as it is shown by its connection to symbols such as “Transparency”, 
“Neutrality” and “Objective assessment”. “Family” appears as an axial symbol but 
in connection with current themes such as “Parental leave”, “Protection of minors”, 
and “Fighting domestic sexual violence”. Ultimately, FDTL presents itself as a mod-
ern and secularized party, which addresses its appeal to the most advanced social 
and economic strata of Tunisia, such as those found in urban centers or more ex-
posed to Western influence.
The case of CPR is interesting because it is a party founded abroad in 2001 by oppo-
nents of the Ben Ali regime. The references to “Development” and “economic growth” 
are central to the CPR program, but in connection with the “regional” dimension, the 
“development of the Maghreb”, “integration” and “cooperation”. CPR greatly empha-
sizes the cultural dimension of its action, as the symbols related to “culture” show, 
such as “Arabic-Islamic Ministry”, “Superior Council of Culture” and “cultural free-
dom”. CPR is the party that mostly addresses the state establishment and in particular 
the magistrates and the “Judicial system” (axial symbol). This inclination can probably 
be explained as an attempt of the CPR to secure the support of the magistrates and of 
part of the state apparatus. We can similarly interpret the attention to the “Military” 
and to the “National defense” (axial symbols) to which the symbols “military forma-
tion”, “strategy”, “industry” and “military courts” are connected. The defense of the 
“Arab identity” is underlined, also in connection with “Arab-Islamic origins” and “Arab 
revival”. Ultimately, CPR is a party that proposes itself as a political guide in the hy-
pothesis of a transplacement (Huntington 1991: 151-161) within the regime. For this 
reason, in its program there is an attempt to balance references to modernization and 
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political transition with aspects of continuity of the Tunisian regime and state, as well 
as the re-establishment of the Islamic tradition.
Finally NT, founded in 2012 by the then Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi, pres-
ents itself as a political party with a secular matrix, with obvious references in its pro-
gram to the social-democratic tradition and to the issues of the welfare state (see the 
relative table in the Appendix). The most recurrent axial symbol is “development”, 
which is often found in connection with “research and innovation”, “modernization”, 
according to the typical appeal of parties of the social-democratic tradition. However, 
the social-democratic vision of NT is very attentive to the theme of Tunisian identity 
(“Tunisia, Tunisian nation”, 53 occurrences), which is found with the connected sym-
bols “economic development”, “Tunisian history and culture”, “tourism”, occasionally 
also with “Revolution and Freedom”. The axial symbols “Employment” (44 occurrenc-
es), “Enterprise” (37), “training and education” (36), “Youth” (35) are among the most 
common. It should be noted that the NT program reports specific references to some 
issues related to the development of a welfare system, as shown by the references to 
the “National Health System” (14 occurrences) and to the “House policy” (18). Any 
reference to the religious dimension is absent, while NT is the party that pays more at-
tention to the gender issue (“Women and gender equality”, “and maternity leave” ap-
pear with 13 occurrences). Finally, references to the Constitution and human rights are 
almost absent, perhaps a sign that at this stage of post-democratization fundamental 
rights no longer seem threatened. In essence, NT offers itself as a progressive party, 
with an explicit social-democratic matrix, which addresses its appeal to the middle, 
educated and urbanized classes of Tunisia.
Figs. 1-2 provide a summary view of the “party-defined space” as emerges from 
the analysis of the contents of the manifestos of the four parties and their qualitative 
comparison. In Fig. 1 the parties are positioned in a two-dimensional space defined 
according to the scheme of Lipset and Rokkan, crossing the territorial dimension with 
the functional one. After the Tunisian transition to democracy, the territorial dimen-
sion manifests itself as an opposition between the vision of the state as a rational-legal 
institution and the tendency to reaffirm the basic communities and the regions. The 
first vision is clearly a legacy of the French post-colonial tradition, while the second 
is affected by the attempt to recover local identities and above all the ethnic com-
ponents. Along the functional dimension, there is a “universal” vision that accepts 
the effects of the modernization and globalization of the markets and a “particular” 
vision, still linked to the local dimension and the value of solidarity. Looking at the 
symbolic content of the programs of the four parties (see Appendix), there is clearly 
a contrast between the vision of an “integrated” Tunisia proposed by FDTL and the 
“insular” vision defended by EN. This last, along the territorial dimension, underlines 
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the geographical and community composition of Tunisia, almost never proposing a 
state perspective. Along the functional dimension, EN continually refers to local and 
regional economic development, which is balanced and takes into account the needs of 
civil society. Finally, the references to the global economic dimension are absent. FDTL 
instead presents a vision that we could define as “Integrated” Tunisia. FDTL places the 
maximum emphasis on the “rational-legal” character of the new Tunisian state, which 
must be democratic, guarantee freedom and be endowed with an efficient central ad-
ministration. For this reason, in the FDTL program we also find significant references 
to the importance of training and higher and university education. The concept of 
society and the economy of FDTL, along the functional dimension, is clearly inspired 
by globalization, as shown in the program by the frequent referrals to the levels of 
investments and infrastructure, to the economic development linked to international 
markets, to innovation and business competition. CPR instead places itself in an in-
termediate position between these, because it accepts the secular vision of the state 
(territorial dimension), but from the functional point of view it underlines both the 
aspects of the cooperation of Tunisia with its Arab neighbors and the emerging coun-
tries, and with the EU. Ultimately, the vision of CPR along the economic-functional 
dimension is suspended between a cautious adhesion to globalization and the will to 
preserve the Tunisian matrix of development. Finally, as we have said, NT presents 
itself in 2012 with a clear secular, progressive and social-democratic vision, in fact 
launching an open challenge to the confessional vision of EN. 
In Fig. 2 the democratic dimension has been crossed with the societal dimension. 
Indeed, party programs present different perspectives in the conception of democra-
cy and the social community. A counterpoint between the procedural or madisonian 
conception of democracy and a populistic one (Dahl 1956) is clearly evident, while 
the confessional-secular cleavage appears on the societal axis. Also in this party-de-
fined space the contrast between EN and FDTL appears clear. The former, welcomes 
the populist vision of democracy and makes itself the defender of the Arab-Muslim 
identity, and it places the traditional family at the center of its program. In EN’s pro-
gram we also find the only explicit references to God and the idea that Tunisian soci-
ety must be declined in the Arab-Muslim identity. Nonetheless, EN can be considered 
among the “religiously oriented parties” as a conservative type, which acquired at 
least some features of catch-all parties appealing to all voters except convinced an-
ti-clericals (Ozzano 2013). Ultimately, EN defends the idea of  a “Traditional Tunisia” 
and our findings are consistent with Cavatorta and Merone (2013), who argued that 
EN moved from its extreme anti-systemic position of the 1970s to become a main-
stream conservative party. EN was originally part of the Tunisian Islamist movement 
developed from the early 1970s as a critical approach to Bourguiba’s attempt to mod-
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ernize the country according to a model that would follow the secular tradition of 
France. The analysis of the political manifesto of EN shows that it “has moved away 
progressively from its anti-democratic and illiberal position to become a much more 
traditional religiously oriented political party” (Cavatorta and Merone 2013: 873).  On 
the contrary, FDTL emphasizes the role of political institutions that represent pro-
cedural and representative democracy, such as the parliament, the elected president, 
the constitution and the courts that must defend it. In the FDTL program there are 
no confessional references. CPR in this two-dimensional space does not differ much 
from FDTL and also inclines towards a conception of “Modernized Tunisia”. FDTL 
and other secular parties constitute the political base on which eventually a new ral-
ly of the secular camp was possible with the foundation of NT. From December 2011 
three subsequent governments followed, and they were supported in the ANC by the 
same coalition. The first two governments were led by leaders of EN while the third 
government was a caretaker one led by Mehdi Jomaa (January 2014 – February 2015). 
The latter enjoyed an even wider support in the ANC including some smaller parties. 
Under the leadership of Mehdi Jomaa, the Tunisian government tackled some issues 
related to the economic situation and left the assembly free to focus on the orga-
nization of the new political elections. Moreover, Mehdi Jomaa’s government man-
aged a sort of national reconciliation after the former controversial leadership of 
Ali Laarayedh during whose service in office several leftist activists were murdered.3 
Meanwhile, the group composition of the ANC underwent some remarkable changes. 
With the exception of EN, between 2011 and 2014 both the CPR and FDTL suffered 
from floor crossing and splits. A number of new secularist split groups were generat-
ed, notably Alliance démocratique, Groupe démocratique and Transition démocratique. 
Pétition populaire, the populist and personal party of Hechmi Hamdi, disappeared 
from the ANC as an autonomous group.4
This reconfiguration of groups in the ANC was also the effect of the birth of NT 
as the new rally of the secular camp. Although NT does not directly address the con-
stitutional and democratic question in its program, the constant reference to social 
rights is a clear indication that the political conception of NT is very close to the lib-
eral-democratic one. Contrary to expectations, the fragmentation and the following 
re-configuration of the assembly before the 2014 elections helped to reach mediation 
3 These political crimes cast a negative shade on Ali Laarayedh and brought about unprecedented 
political tensions after the transition of 2011. Ali Laarayedh was indeed considered by the secular camp 
as a hardliner among Ennahdha. He was forced to resign in January 2014.
4 Twelve of its MPs resigned from the party already in November 2011 by declaring themselves 
independent, others quitted the party thereafter. In 2014 the party managed to gain two parliamentary 
seats.
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on the most delicate issues such as the place of secularism in the Constitution and the 
form of government.
The 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. Cleavages and 
the regional dimension
The analysis previously carried out on the manifestos of the four major Tunisian po-
litical parties of the transitional phase has served to design a “party-defined space”, 
which allows the identification of the main cleavages and issues that have guided the 
political struggle in Tunisia up to the first parliamentary elections of 2014.5 Now let 
us turn our attention to this post transition phase. To what extent have the cleavages 
of the post-transition phase been maintained and how far have they guided the 2014 
political electoral campaign? What are the prospects for the 2019 elections?
Under the national dialogue promoted by the civil society and as a result of the 
new favorable political climate, a new constitution was finally adopted on January 26th 
2014. As part of the same deal a new government was selected under the leadership 
of Mehdi Jomaa, which led the country in the transitional period to new elections. On 
26th October 2014 parliamentary elections were held, followed at the end of November 
by the first round of presidential elections. As recalled above, the main novelty of this 
phase is the birth of the new secularist party NT in 2012, which can be effectively con-
sidered the “political heir” of FDTL and of other secularist parties. The electorate of 
NT is secularized and it coincides with the electorate that in 2011 had supported FDTL. 
Moreover, as illustrated above, NT’s program may be labeled as “social-democrat” and 
it presents many points of contact with that of FDTL. The 2014 Parliamentary elec-
tions significantly gave to NT a relative majority of 86 seats, while EN gained 69 of the 
overall 217 seats in the Assembly of Representatives of the People (see Tab. 3). 
By the end of November, the first round of the presidential election was held. 
Unexpectedly, EN refused to present its own candidate and decided to support the in-
cumbent president Moncef Marzouki, notwithstanding that Marzouki’s party (CPR) had 
almost disappeared from the ARP. Therefore, support by EN was crucial for Marzouki 
but not enough to guarantee him the Presidency,6 which was won by Caid Essebsi of 
5 The parliament is elected for a 5-year term, but can be dissolved earlier by the President following 
a failure to form a government, or a failed confidence vote. The country was divided into 27 multi-
member constituencies (mostly coinciding with governorates) for 199 seats (between four and 10 seats 
each) plus 18 seats distributed among six constituencies abroad for a total of 217 MPs.
6 We can assume that in 2014 CPR’s voters turned largely to EN, as seems evident observing the data 
of the second presidential run. 
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NT with about 56% of votes at the second turn. Discussions followed between the two 
main parties over the formation of the new government which was eventually led by 
Habib Essid (February 2015 – August 2016), an independent politician, who had served 
as Home Affairs Minister in the interlude government of Caid Essebsi in 2011 after the 
demise of the Ben Ali’s regime. Essid’s government was supported by a large coalition 
of NT, EN, the UPL (Union Patriotique Libre)7 and Afek Tounes.
The presidential elections showed a country roughly divided into two political ar-
eas: in the North, the secularist Caid Essebsi largely prevailed, while in the South 
the pro-Ennahdha Marzouki resulted as the most voted candidate. Two core-opposed 
areas could be observed. Tunis and the Sahel were pro-Essebsi and NT, whilst the 
South, Sfax and Kairouan, were largely pro-EN. However in the underdeveloped West, 
some leftist anti-government parties, particularly the Front populaire (FP), drew many 
of their votes. This electoral result at the first round of the Presidential elections is 
coherent with the result of the parliamentarian elections, which in the West marked 
the affirmation of some small personal parties (see Tabb. 4-5). Presumably, the left-
ist anti-government voters of the West opted for Essebsi at the second round of the 
Presidential elections.8 
7 Founded by the Tunisian businessman Slim Riahi, UPL is a “liberal” and secularist party, however 
marked by the personality of its founder. It was the third largest group in the ARP. 
8 The West is the Tunisian region with the lowest pro-capita income (Boughzala & Tlili Hamdi 2014: 
10). About a dozen parties compose the FP. A large part of its members were originally members of the 
PCOT (Parti communiste des ouvriers de Tunisie) and Hamma Hammami, former leader of the PCOT, is 
its spokesperson. Notwithstanding that FP is a party which rallies many political fractions, it has not 
Tab. 3 – 2014 Parliamentary Election (Turn Out 68.4%)
PARTY SEATS VOTES %
NIDAA TOUNES 86 1,280,000 37.6
ENNAHDA 69 948,000 27.8
UNION PATRIOTIQUE LIBRE 16 141,000 4.0
FRONT POPULAIRE 15 125,000 3.7
AFEK TOUNES 8 103,000 3.0
OTHERS (CPR) 23 (4) (70,000) 23.9
TOTAL VALID 217 3,580,000 100.0
[Source: ISIE 2014]
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Rallying the secularist forces behind NT was a key strategy to win a majority of 
votes in the country, yet the cohabitation between the secularists and the Islamists 
became very demanding for both the components behind the government. However, 
party cohesion in EN was no match for that of the parties rallied in the secular camp, 
where towards the end of 2015 a split appeared between a faction that hardly tolerated 
any cohabitation with the Islamists and one that was rather more disposed to com-
promise with EN. In December 2015, these divisions exploded and Mohsen Marzouk, 
been marred by any defection among its MP’s since 2014. FP obtained in 2014 about 125,000 votes 
(3.7% of the total cast), 1/3 of which were casted in the underdeveloped West. Consequently, six out 
of the fifteen MPs of FP were elected in the West districts, where the votes for the FP were about 1/5 
of those for NT and about 1/3 of the votes for EN. The rooting of FP in the West (particularly in the 
district of Sidi Bouzid) and the economic backwardness of this area might provide an explanation of the 
outburst of protests in 2011 and more recently in January 2018 against the government.
Tab. 4 – 2014 Presidential Election (I Round – 23.11.14)
CANDIDATE VOTES %
CAID ESSEBSI (NT) 1,290,000 39.5
MONCEF MARZOUKI (CPR) 1,093,000 33.4
HAMMA HAMMAMI (FP) 256,000 7.8
OTHERS 629,000 19.3
TOTAL VALID 3,268,000 100.0
[Source: ISIE 2014]
Tab 5 – 2014 Presidential Election (II Round – 21.12.14)
CANDIDATE VOTES %
CAID ESSEBSI (NT) 1,732,000 55.7
MONCEF MARZOUKI (CPR) 1,379,000 44.3
TOTAL VALID 3,111,000 100.0
[Source: ISIE 2014]
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co-founder and secretary of NT resigned after clashing with the faction led by Hafedh 
Caid Essebsi, son of the president of the Republic. More than twenty MPs followed 
him, and in March 2016 Mohsen Marzouk founded a new political party, Machrouu 
Tounes (“Tunisia project”). As a consequence, the parliamentary group of NT started 
to decline in number, counting in July 2017 56 MPs from the original 86, and as a con-
sequence EN became the largest parliamentary group. The MPs of Machrouu Tounes in 
the APR joined the Bloc al Horra (BH), while other eight members of NT merged in May 
2017 in a newly constituted Bloc National (BN).9
In October 2016, another group was formed – Bloc Démocrate – made of different 
parties, mostly members of CPR and of MDP (Mouvement du Peuple).10 Bloc Démocrate 
decided to remain in opposition, while BH and BN offered parliamentary support to 
the newly formed coalition government under the leadership of Youssef Chahed (since 
August 2016).11 The cabinet portfolios were allocated mainly to no-party and indepen-
dent members, some of whom had already served as ministers in the previous cabinet. 
The dynamic of the secularist camp seems therefore incoherent, the secularist forces 
rallied against EN but they were subsequently incapable of coherent action and they 
split again. Thanks to these splits and divisions in the secular camp, EN acquired a 
new central position in the APR (Assemblée des Representants du Peuple), the Tunisian 
single chamber parliament, where it is now the main group (see Tab. 6). EN was able to 
maintain a greater cohesion and avoid floor-crossing and lost only one MP. Discipline 
in the party is very strong and differences about political strategies, which regard 
mostly whether or not to support any coalitional government with secular forces, have 
been always minimized in order to avoid splits.12
9 Differences between those who adhered to BN and BH are difficult to ascertain. Members of BN have 
been for the most members also of BH. Almost all the MPs of BN (six out of eight) were elected in the 
constituencies of the Great Tunis. The MPs of BH are for their part more representative of the regional 
differences in the country, although most of them come from the North. The party composition of both 
BN and BH is made of former “second rank members” of NT.
10 The MDP is a Nasserist party, which elected three MPs in the APR.
11 Youssef Chahed’s government received formal investiture by the APR with 167 votes out of 194. 
Votes of confidence were cast by EN, NT, al Horra, UPL and AT. Curiously, two abstention votes came 
from two NT parliamentarians who have nonetheless remained in the party.
12 Discipline is high in the Assembly where participation by EN members is on average higher than 
the other parties, but is also managed by an executive bureau – Bureau Exécutif (BE) − made of 25 
members and approved by the Choura during July 2016. Democracy in the party is ruled by the Choura 
which is a consultative council, which also is supposed to approve most of the decisions of the BE. The 
Choura is made of 150 members, 100 of them elected by the Congress with a secret ballot and the others 
designated by those elected in order to ensure a regional/gender equilibrium as well as representation 
of professions and a minimum number of MPs.
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The Future of the Tunisian party system from 2014 to the Municipal 
elections of 2018
In 2016 EN held its 10th Congress, the first after its legalization in March 2011. The 
Congress broadcasted the moderate and responsible profile of the party. It marked 
the transition of the movement into a real party by “separating” the religious and 
the political activities. This evolution started when the party rapidly learned lessons 
from the changes in the international setting after the overthrow of the Brotherhood 
in Egypt by the Sisi coup in 2013. Since then the short momentum of religious parties 
in the Islamic world, which had commenced with the Arab spring of 2011, has ended. 
The civil war in Syria, the mounting of terrorism, and most recently the crisis be-
tween Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the major sponsor of movements affiliated or related 
to the Brotherhood, have also impacted on EN, moving the party towards a strategy 
which is more conceivable as “conservative” rather than “Islamic”, therefore follow-
ing a similar pattern as the Turkish AKP during the 2000’s (Özbudun, 2006; Bayat, 
2013; Wolf 2013). This should imply the acceptance of pluralism, the value of na-
tional unity against Islamic internationalism and the centrality of Islamic values in 
Tab. 6 – Distributions of Seats in the House of Representatives
PARTY Seats as July 2018
Difference with respect 
to the initial allocation 
(2014)
ENNAHDA 68 -1
NIDAA TOUNES 55 -31
BLOC AL HORRA¹ 19 +19
FRONT POPULAIRE 15 =
UNION PATRIOTIQUE LIBRE 12 -4
BLOC DÉMOCRATE² 12 +12
ALLEGEANCE A LA PATRIE³ 10 +10
BLOC NATIONAL¹ 10 +10
OTHERS 14 -9
¹ Made by former NT members.
² Mostly formed by ex CPR members plus panarabists from Mouvement du Peuple.
3  Group made for the most by former AT and NT members.
vol. 2, 1/2019 23
ISSN 2611-2914 (online)
ISSN 2611-4216 (print)
POLIARCHIE/POLYARCHIES
pp. 4-44
PARTY SYSTEM AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN TUNISIAF. BATTERA and G. IERACI
Tunisian society. It could be that the acceptance of pluralism was a camouflage and 
an opportunistic tactical move by EN, as implied by the parties of the secular camp. 
Whatever the case, it is a matter of fact that, at the moment, EN does not enjoy an 
absolute majority in parliament or in the country. While the 2011 elections marked 
the best result for EN (37% of the votes), the 2014 elections show a flowing back. 
The hope of the party is therefore to regain political centrality by exploiting the 
divisions in the secular camp, by enlarging towards the right its core support, while 
maintaining at the same time a social profile which could appeal to the lower classes. 
The emergence of a new generation of young MPs and cadres has been also crucial 
in improving the party profile, although EN still results “older” by age composition if 
compared with NT and its split parties.
Fig. 3 – 2014 Political Elections: Mapping the Electoral Results of NT and EN by Electoral Districts
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The electorate of EN could be put into two groups: the emerging urban middle 
class and the rural poor classes. Therefore, it could be classified as a conservative and 
class-cutting party. This is consistent with the picture outlined by the “party-defined 
space” (Figs. 1-2 above), which as we have seen identifies as the main characteristics of 
EN the local-regional vision, attentive to the religious identity of Tunisia, and the pro-
pensity to favor a populist conception of democracy. As the electoral results show, the 
support for EN is much wider in the poor Southern regions than in the underdeveloped 
West (see Fig. 3), where its diffusion is hindered by a political culture and attitudes 
characterized by protest and resentment which are typical of the lower social strata. 
EN is also well represented in urban areas, in big conurbations such as Greater Tunis. 
There are also no significant differences in social and regional origins between the 
emerging urban middle class and rural poor classes, since the former are often of the 
same origins as the latter, representing the most successful strata of the older exodus. 
In a country where poor classes are ample,13 and rural exodus is relevant, patronage 
has maintained a crucial role for party legitimacy. From this point of view, EN has 
filled, or aims at filling the vacuum left by the RCD.
The distribution of the MPs in the 2014 political elections obviously reflected the 
vote distribution of EN as represented in Fig. 3. The EN MPs coming from the South 
(including the district of Kairouan) prevail over those coming from the other regions, 
although conurbations like Tunis or Sfax are also well-represented. This predomi-
nance of Southerners in EN against Sahelians in NT is also marked by the regional or-
igin of some EN MPs elected in Greater Tunis such as Ali Laarayedh, Sahbi Atig, Jamila 
Debbech and others, not considering those elected abroad, a great part of whom are 
from the South by family origin.14 Out of the 68 MPs of EN, 27 are women and several 
among them are engaged in Islamic oriented civil society organizations.15 If we com-
pare EN with NT MPs according to their profession (percentage), the results not only 
reflects their social roots but also their potential constituencies, with liberal profes-
sions and the top positions in the private sector still dominated by secularist represen-
tatives, while the public sector, in particular education is growingly dominated by the 
religious party. Therefore, employees of lower educational levels are found among EN 
MPs (20.6% out of the total) and less among NT MPs (5.3%), whilst entrepreneurs or 
13 The percentage of population living below the national poverty line was estimated to be about 15.2 
in 2015 (https://data.worldbank.org/country/Tunisia).
14 According to the geographic distribution, , 39.3% of EN MPs out of the total were elected in the 
South, Kairouan and Sfax constituencies. Only 11.8% of NT MPs were elected in the same area. On the 
contrary, 58.9% of NT MPs were elected in the area which include Sahel and the Greater Tunis area 
against 42,7% for EN.
15 All these and the following data are available on https://majles.marsad.tn/2014/fr/assemblee.
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managers of the private sector are more likely found in NT (26.8%) than in EN (11.8%). 
This professional background of the MPs of NT reflects the attitude and preferences of 
the secular electors. 
Once again (see Appendix and the related discussion above), the party manifestos 
of 2011 highlighted these differences. The secular camp party in that phase, that is 
FDTL, declared its commitment to a constitutional structure with elective presiden-
tial and powers to dissolve parliament. EN, on the other hand, frequently emphasized 
the principle of popular sovereignty and republican values, with an obviously more 
populist accent. We are in the presence of the opposition between the procedural and 
Madisonian conception of democracy, on the one hand, and the populistic one, on 
the other (see Fig. 2). As EN accepted to maintain a diluted form of division between 
religion and politics,16 a compromise was reached between the secular camp, which fa-
vored presidentialism, and EN, which favored parliamentarism. The result was a mixed 
form of government where the president is directly elected as head of the state for 
a maximum of two terms and a prime minister is the head of the government.17 The 
16 After several drafts, the new constitution was approved in January 2014. The most delicate issues 
regarded the place of religion and the relations between Islam and the state. The constitutional 
debate attracted attention and it is well discussed in literature (Marks 2014; Netterstrøm 2015). For a 
reconstruction of the Tunisian constitutional process, see Carter Center (2014).
17 Among the most important powers attributed to the President is the power to dissolve the 
parliament (see above, footnote 6).
Tab. 7 – Party Fragmentation in Parliament: The Secular vs. the Religious Camp (2011-18)
Camps
Parties
(as October 
2011)
Seats
Parties
(as October 
2014)
Seats
Parliamentary 
Groups
(as July 2018)
Seats
Secularist
FDTL 20
Nidaa Tounes 86
Nidaa Tounes 55
PDP 16 Bloc Al Horra 19
Al-Moubadara 5 UPL 16 UPL 12
PDM 5
Afek Tounes 8
Allegeance a la 
patrie 10
Afek Tounes 4 Bloc National 10
Religious Ennahdha 89 Ennahdha 69 Ennahdha 68
vol. 2, 1/2019 26
ISSN 2611-2914 (online)
ISSN 2611-4216 (print)
POLIARCHIE/POLYARCHIES
pp. 4-44
PARTY SYSTEM AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN TUNISIAF. BATTERA and G. IERACI
major problem for the secular camp is therefore to create a cohesive party which could 
represent those interests. Personalisms in NT badly impacted on its cohesion (see 
Tab. 7). In other words, while EN has established itself as a cohesive party and it is ca-
pable of appealing to the most conservative sectors of Tunisian society, NT has failed 
to become a stronghold of the secular camp, lacking party cohesion and being subject 
to fragmentation and floor-crossing. 
Conclusion. Democracy, Personal Power and Party System in Tunisia
Waiting for the next political elections scheduled in 2019, the municipal elections held 
on the May, 6th 2018 came as a shock. The turnout was lower than expected – about 
35.6% – and organized parties managed to obtain less than 68% of votes, since more 
than 32% went to independent lists. EN obtained 28.6% and NT 20.9% of the votes. NT, 
as expected, lost about 800,000 votes in comparison to the 2014 elections, confirming 
its crisis. EN obtained a little more than half million votes, half the votes obtained in 
2014, and one third of its result in 2011. 
Given the high fragmentation of lists and parties, the interpretation of these elec-
toral results is not easy. However, it is possible to identify some general trends, which 
are partially consistent with previous ones. EN still has its major electoral strongholds 
in the South and in some areas of the Greater Tunis. Moreover, EN has resulted the 
most voted party in the majority of the municipalities of the South. EN has also been 
able to win in 11 out of 18 municipalities in the Bizerte governorship. NT has main-
tained its strength in the Northern areas and in the Sahel, although losing important 
positions at the expense of independent lists in major towns.18 NT has also obtained 
good results in some districts of the West regions. 
What has been the impact of the 2018 local elections on the party system and on 
the government? Could we consider them as a test for the coming general elections 
2019? In terms of absolute votes and relative percentages, EN has been in the 2018 lo-
cal election very far from equalizing the success registered in 2011. Nonetheless, there 
has at least been a confirmation of the result obtained in 2014 (which was 27.8% of 
the votes). EN remains, therefore, the largest and most resilient party in the Tunisian 
system, and it is well rooted in the South and in the conurbations. EN maintains an 
important leverage in terms of patronage and influence for future governments, by 
means of controlling some major municipalities. NT, on the other hand, has collapsed 
18 NT was the second most voted party in Tunis (after EN), and in Monastir (after an independent list). 
It was confirmed as first party In Nabeul and Sousse, although only by relative majority (23%).
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from 37.6% of the votes obtained in 2014 to 20.9% in 2018. It is still the second largest 
Tunisian party, it is moreover relatively well consolidated in the Sahel and in the West, 
but it has now lost about 800,000 votes that have swung to various independent lists 
and partially got lost because of abstention from voting. In other words, vote disper-
sion has affected the secular camp more than the confessional one and that explains 
why EN with a loss of more than 400,000 votes in the 2018 local election, compared to 
the 2014 results, can still claim to be the major Tunisian party.
Nonetheless the haemorrhage of votes suffered by NT has not favoured any of its 
challengers in the secular camp, because of the before mentioned success and frag-
mentation of independent lists. NT was created as a secularist rally behind Beiji Caid 
Essebsi, but it is hard to predict that he might be successful again in 2019 using the 
same political programme adopted at the debut of the party in 2012 (see above the 
discussion of the party manifesto). In this perspective, the 2018 municipal elections 
resemble those for the Constituent Assembly in 2011, when the secular camp was 
deeply divided and EN won a majority of votes and seats. If divisions among the sec-
ular camp persist, it could be argued that the 2018 local elections provided a reliable 
test for the forthcoming 2019 political elections. The 2019 elections remain there-
fore uncertain and the perspective of a new rally of the secular forces against EN is 
probably doomed to failure. The 2018 local elections also revealed the inability of a 
secular party to take root because of the patronage and factionalism which are still 
dominating Tunisian politics.
The democratization in Tunisia after 2011 has certainly produced social tensions, 
following the growth of new expectations in the classes that in the past were mar-
ginal (Weilandt 2019). Compared to the uncertainties of the first phase of democ-
ratization, when one wondered if democracy would take root (Landolt and Kubicek 
2014), today the prospects appear less gloomy. Firstly, it should be emphasized that 
in Tunisia “secularists and Islamists tried to adopt more conciliatory policies vis-à-
vis each other in order to prevent an Egyptian-style coup and the possibility of col-
lapsing the Tunisian state via internal strife” (Somer 2017: 1037). Many studies have 
shown that this compromise was favored by the pluralism of Tunisian society and 
the relative strength of the organizations of interests and the working class (Allinson 
2015). Secondly, as we have already implied, in the Tunisian case EN constitutes an 
exception with respect to the affirmation of religious parties in recently democra-
tizing Muslim countries. In general, the immoderation of incumbent Islamic parties 
must be observed, for example in Turkey and Egypt. However, EN is the exception 
to these more uncertain developments, due to its availability to compromise with 
the opposition parties and civil society organizations (Kirdiş 2018; Torelli, Merone 
and Cavatorta 2012; Wolf 2013). These moderating tendencies have also been favored 
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by the new Constitution of 2014, which “creates a political system with many veto 
players with a thin line between consensus and deadlock” (Pickard 2014: 259). In this 
way, destructive conflicts have been prevented and the political process is forced to 
compromise. As a result, the current Tunisian regime consists of a bargaining system 
between Islamists and old regime elites, which seek to legitimize each other despite 
a fierce competition over political resources. These trade-offs involve the Islamists 
of EN and the networks of the secularists and the old regime, in particular NT as the 
heir of FDTL (Boubekeur 2016).
Finally, from a systemic point of view, the Tunisian party alignment, although ex-
tremely fluid, at the moment resembles what has been labelled as «multilateral dis-
tribution with dominant party». EN is the dominant party, and its relative decline is 
compensated by the current difficulties of the secular forces to rally in a stable and 
cohesive party. We are indeed observing a relatively fluid party system, which could 
easily be moving to a new structure and dynamics of «multilateral distribution with 
no dominant party» (Ieraci 2012). This potential evolution is highlighted by the com-
position of the coalition governments, that have included over time parties from the 
confessional and the secular camps. This type of party system, as has been proved by 
the experience of the democratic transition in Eastern and Central Europe after the 
collapse of the Communist regimes, tends to be highly fragmented and lacking in any 
anchor points. The newly born political parties lacked any clear ideological identity 
and they were appealing both to the left and right electorate, from different social 
strata, sometimes as a result of large electoral alliances. 
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Appendix
Content Analysis of the Parties’ Manifestos
Ennahdha (EN)
Axial symbol Connected symbols n.
Development balanced and civil society
children
global
human
of society
of the economic sector
financing of -
of cooperation
of the country
local, regional, balanced
of the banking sector
agricultural
of tourism
and the Kyoto protocol
university teaching and -
scientific knowledge and -
Tunisian production and -
26
Arab identity/Muslim/Islam Arab-Muslim identity 
Arab-Muslim culture in the world
Arab as language (of the Tunisian state)
Islamic finance 
Islamic banks
16
Partnership consent and social pact
between states and peoples
with Arab and African countries
with the EU
with USA, Canada and Japan
between university and business
14
People wellness of the -
sovereignty of - 12
Youth Family
economic enterprise 
National Youth Observatory 
youth tourism
11
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Technology and innovation 
technological poles for network management 11
Family/Relatives - and business
assistance to – 9
Women right to work 
freedom against clothing style 
in education and culture
as rural economy worker
protection of – 
as mothers (breastfeeding) 
achievements of – 
equality between men and women discrimination 
and violence against – 
no to the economic and social exclusion of -
9
Freedom public and individual 
of expression 
of association 
of belief and thought
8
Jobs and labour market and family 
value of work 
right to work 
family needs and work
8
State (Tunisia) free and independent
modern
of law
civil
respectful of political freedom
as a guarantee against dictatorship
7
Childhood/children rights of – 
assistance for – 
as handicap bearers
7
Tunisian society/Civil society and Arab-Muslim identity
independent from the state
and civilization
7
Tunisia as a market for craft products 
as a technological port 
as a medical tourism hub 
as a regional financial center 
as a university teaching pole
6
Market - social and solidarity 
Maghreb common market 
Public and private complementarity
6
Republic 4
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Revolution (Arab spring) 4
Modernization and working methods 
teaching 
and modern administration 
of technical / industrial structures
4
God and security
and people 3
Reforms 2
Heritage National 
- and tourism 2
Dialogue between Cultures / 
Differences 2
Pacific alternation in power 2
Rule of law and equality 2
Religion Islam as State religion 1
Tunisians abroad and Arab-Muslim identity 1
Citizenship 1
Democracy 1
Social pact 1
Multi-party system 1
Goverment responsible before the parliament 1
Elections for positions of responsibility 1
Divorce 1
Colonization 1
Patronage and clientelism 1
Dictatorship 3
Corruption 3
 
[Source: www.ennahdha.tn (2013)]
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Ettakatol (FDTL)
Axial symbol Connected symbols n.
State Sovereign people
Identity of the Tunisian people
Defense of the Arabic language
Defense of religious freedom
Democratic
Guarantee of social cohesion
Equality and social justice
Central State Administration
Stimulation of economic investments
16
Investments Infrastructure and the fight against corruption 
Reduction of corporate tax 
Bank orientation to investment 
Innovative entrepreneurs 
Private investment in culture 
Creation of an agency for cultural investments 
Business culture 
Social pact between citizens and business
11
Constitution Constitutional Court
Constitutional rights
Human rights
8
Training and education Compulsory education
Reform of secondary education
Contrast of early school leaving
University reform and autonomy
7
Parliament Parliamentary majority
Parliamentary control of the government
Creation of a Maghreb parliament
Law initiative
7
Rights Constitutional rights 
Human rights 
Rights of foreigners 
5
Judiciary and justice Improve the working conditions of judges 
Independence of judges 
Training and specialization 
Superior Council of the Magistracy as guarantor 
5
Regional and municipal 
administrative structures
Autonomy 
Decentralization 
Support for regions and municipalities 5
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Administration Adjustment of working hours for administrative staff 
Transparency of procedures 
Administration neutrality 
Objective assessment of the administration 
4
Family Parental leave 
Extracurricular activities of young people 
Protection of minors 
Fighting domestic sexual violence
4
Economic development Creation of five macro regions
International market 
Innovative and competitive industries 
Tunisia as a service hub
4
President Direct election 
Guarantor of balance 
Presidential power to dissolve the parliament 
3
Election, principle of - of local authorities
of the members of the Superior Council of the 
Magistracy 
of local authorities 
3
Judicial power Independence of judicial power 
Compensation for victims and reconciliation 3
Media Creation of an independent authority 
Ensure neutrality 3
Ministry of the Interior and 
Order
Guarantee of neutrality 
Reorganization 
Placed at the service of the nation 
3
Equality between genres 
among individuals 
of opportunities among young people 
3
Tunisian people identity Tunisian culture 2
Rule of law Law equal for all 
Guarantees for the defense of the accused 2
Social justice 2
Work Creation of 100 thousand jobs in the public service 
Creation of job centers 2
Freedom public and individual 
Fundamental rights 2
Tax system Fair and just
Tax relief for the poor classes 2
Agricultural development Full rural development 
Agricultural credit 
Land use
2
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Transparency of the parliamentary debate 
Court of Auditors 2
Tourism Hotel development 
Crafts related to tourism 
Local culture
2
Renewable energy 1
Army and defense Neutrality 1
Emerging countries Strengthen ties with - 1
Palestinian people Support the – 1
Revolution (Arab Spring) Democratic thought 
Freedom in the Arab world 
Creation of an Arab Democratic Union 
1
Urban development 1
Transportation 1
European Union Review of association agreements 1
[Source: www.ettakatol.org (2013)]
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Congrès pour la République (CPR)
Axial symbols Connected symbols n.
Development / economic 
growth
regional – 
Arab Fund for Maghreb Development 
sustainable –
alternative energy and – electronic media for the –
- in the health sector 
- and consultation 
- and regional marginalization internal – 
Free economic system and – balanced –
- and integration
- and cooperation
34
Culture Arab-Islamic Ministry 
Superior Council of Culture 
Cultural freedom
18
Judicial system/magistrates Independent
Unification of the -
17
Social justice inequality and –
- and social policies
- and social classes
17
Security National - 14
State sovereign – 
- budget 
- social
13
Tax system - and progressive rates
taxpayer protection from -
revision of tax exemptions
promotion of tax administration
complete tax legislation
fiscal balance
- and tax burden
- and social injustice
income tax revision
exemption of low incomes
- and capital surplus
Tax collector, elimination of -
review local taxes
- as a resource for the state
13
Investments and firms 12
Public sector - and health
- and national debt
- right of health assistance
12
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Citizenship - and democracy
- and participation
- and local democracy
12
Market and business global –
Tunisian international trade cooperation and 
traders
loans to small companies
Contrast corruption
11
Reforms and transparency 10
Associations sport and -
- and civil society 
10
Tourism 10
Freedom protection of -
- of information
- from dependence
9
Environment - and development
Legislation on – 9
Cooperation - with EU 
regional economic and finance – 
school-industry – 
Tunisia with Arab neighbors 
Technologic – 
with emerging countries
- in the agricultural sector
- in the health sector
- between government and regional and local 
authorities
8
Information and computer 
technology
Freedom of – 
- and piracy 8
Rights Human rights
Equality of rights 7
Scientific research 7
Military - military formation 
- strategy 
- industry 
- military courts
7
National defence 5
Arab identity education and programs – 
Arab-Islamic origins 
Union of Arab peoples 
- and consent 
Arab revival
5
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Agricultural policy - and associations product distribution small busi-
ness agricultural sector and environmental issue 5
Laws Constitutional –
- and cultural initiatives 4
Public administration - and tax justice 4
Industry traditional -
military, development of -
industrial sector, development of -
- and cooperation with the state
4
Banks Independence of the Central bank
Transparency
Control over the – 
- for the regional development
4
National debt Submit foreign debt to control
Reduce in foreign debt
Evaluate foreign debt
4
Prisons - and prison police 
- not meeting international standards 3
Technology - policy for technology 
- institutes 3
People 2
Colonization - and corruption 1
Palestine - and Zionist colonization 1
Youth 1
International peace 1
‘Good government’ 1
Zionism 1
Western world 2
Capital - and profit 2
[Source: www.ettakatol.org (2013)]
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Nidaa Tounes (NT)
Axial symbols Connected symbols n.
Development Research and innovation
- and renewable energy
- and national resources
Technology, innovative and competitive industries 
- and finance
- and infrastructure
regional and industrial areas
Modernization
88
Tunisia, Tunisian nation - and economic development
International system and the EU
Tunisian history and culture
Revolution and liberty
- and science
- and tourisme
53
Employment - and youth
- and women
protection of the employment
44
Enterprise - and economic growth
private and free 37
Training and education Compulsory education
Reform of secondary education
Contrast of early school leaving
professional and technological
University autonomy and grant system
36
Youth - and employment
- and entreprise
- and Tunisia
- and education
- and “Corp de la Jeunesse”
- and access to propety
- and agriculture
35
Regions Internal regions
Decentralization 
Regional banks
- and municipalities
Support for regions 
- and development
33
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Investments - and tourisme
Foreign investiments
- and regional development
Private investments and growth
24
State Authority of the -
- and the private sector
- and development
- and security
and rule of law
Guarantee of social rights
Equality and social justice
- and the private sector
- and consolidation of the republican institutions
- and efficient administration
22
Natural resources water 
Fishery and water resources 21
Agriculture and farmers as a strategic sector
- and handicraft
Financing agriculture
20
Housing Guarantee of – 
House policy 18
Social-democracy 18
Public Administration Efficacy of the -
Transparency of procedures 
Administration neutrality 
Struggle against fiscal elusion and fraud
17
Tourism 16
National Health System reform of the -
- opened to everyone 14
Women - and gender equality
- and maternity leave 13
Social economy and 
solidarity
Struggle against poverty abd disadvantage
social aid 9
Social promotion 7
Finance Reform of the financial system
Regional banking system 6
Urban and interurban 
transport 6
Employment 5
Pension schema reform of the - 3
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Family 2
Rule of law Public ethic 2
Constitution 1
Human rights 1
[Source: Nidaa Tounes, Commission économique et sociale, Notre programme pour un développement 
ambitieux au service de tous les Tunisiens, 15 août 2014]
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